

Firm Responses to Climate Change: Exit and Voice

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May 10, 2024

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 - Fades in long-run with adaptation

Literature Focuses on Response to Policy

- Lobbying on mitigation (Cory et al. 2021; Genovese 2019; Kennard 2020; Mildenerger 2020; Meckling 2011)

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- Our goal: understand responses to climate change
- Firms are exposed to climate impacts (Colgan et al. 2021; Baehr et al. 2023)


Firms Are Beginning to Confront Climate Risks



Project Natick

Microsoft's next phase of climate lobbying

Ben Geman, author of [Azure Cleanwater](#)



\$200k in 2021

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- Asset specificity moderates firm responses

Hypothesized Firm Responses to Climate Experiences

Climate change experience →

H1: political expenditures if facing more future damages

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H1: political expenditures if facing more future damages

H2: adaptation if facing future damages

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
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
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 - Geography matters: labor, energy costs, local trade ...

Establishment-Level Measurement Approach



6.6M firm establishments, 1997–2020

Geographic Heterogeneity in Climate Change's Effects



Hsiang et al. (2017)

Establishment-Level Measurement Approach


Average establishment's exposure to climate change:

$$FirmVulnerability_i = \sum_{j=1}^N \frac{Estab_{j(i)}}{\sum_{i=1}^N Estab_i} Damage_j$$

i firms

j establishments in a county

Considerable Within Industry Variation in Vulnerability



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
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 - Future vulnerability

Experience: Extreme Heat Events



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
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- Sensitivity analysis (Cinelli and Hazlett 2020)

Effect of Experience on Voice



Placebo Tests with Non-Climate Issues

	Non-Climate Placebo Lobbying			
	ALC	MMM	VET	CON
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Future Damage _{it} × Extreme Heat	1.1 (1.5)	2.8 (2.0)	0.1 (1.8)	2.4 (2.1)
N	127 605	127 605	127 605	127 605
Adjusted R ²	0.028	0.221	0.076	0.090
Firm Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Effect of Experience on Economic Adaptation

	Short-Term Investment				Exit		
	$t = 0$	$t = -1$	$t = -5$	$t = -10$	$t = -1$	$t = -5$	$t = -10$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Future Damage _{it} × Extreme Heat	55.11**	69.64***	-0.62	19.37	0.00	0.00	-0.01***
	(22.40)	(22.38)	(47.94)	(98.66)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Future Damage _{it}	386.26	280.28	111.06	252.59	0.64***	0.05***	-0.07***
	(354.96)	(265.61)	(113.01)	(613.37)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Extreme Heat	-307.61	-348.18	112.34	-396.28	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
N	104 536	104 536	76 505	43 316	77 428	60 587	36 748
Adjusted R ²	0.674	0.674	0.773	0.841	0.890	0.839	0.859
Firm Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
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- Political economy: incorporate uncertainty

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- Climate politics: firm learning, multiple strategies, novel measure
- Business influence: role of establishments
- Predict medium-term political cleavage; long-run adaptation